Conceptual blending relies on three fundamental representational processes, selective mapping of structure from input spaces to a blended space, making inferences by completing projected structure in the blend, and manipulating structure in the blend. All of these processes require some degree of representational stability. There are two principal ways to achieve stability in conceptual models. First, the conceptual models that anthropologists call "cultural" models achieve representational stability via a combination of intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. Second, projecting material structure into a blended space can stabilize the conceptual blend. I call an input space from which material structure is projected into a blend a 'material anchor' for the blend. The term material anchor is meant to emphasize the stabilizing role of the material structure. In this paper, I will present and discuss a number of examples of materially anchored blends, which depend to different degrees on material structure. Materially anchored blends vary on a number of complexly related dimensions. These dimensions include the extent to which the blend relies on the presence of material structure in the perceptual field, the complexity of the material structure, and whether the material structure was designed to support the blend or is used opportunistically.
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The problem of conceptual stability
Conceptual integration processes sometimes involve complex manipulations of conceptual structure. Fauconnier (1997) describes the essence of the process as follows: A conceptual blend operates in two Input mental spaces to yield a third space, the blend. The blend inherits partial structure from the input spaces and has emergent structure of its own. The emergent structure arises in three interrelated ways:
Composition: Taken together, the projections from the inputs make new relations available that did not exist in the separate inputs.
Completion: Knowledge of background frames, cognitive and cultural models, allows the composite structure projected into the blend from the inputs to be viewed as part of a larger self-contained structure in the blend. The pattern in the blend triggered by the inherited structures is "completed" into the larger, emergent structure.
Elaboration: The structure in the blend can then be elaborated. This is "running the blend." It consists in cognitive work performed within the blend, according to its own emergent logic.
Notice that each of these processes requires that conceptual structure be represented in a way that allows some parts of the representation to be manipulated, while other parts remain stable. The stability of the representations is a necessary feature of the conceptual integration process, but it is often taken for granted. The need for representational stability becomes more visible in circumstances where the necessary stability is not present.
Culturally Based Reasoning
The famous four-card task, originally developed by Wason (1966) , triggered a large number of follow-up studies. Of these, one clearly showed the role of a cultural heritage of mental models in the abilities of individuals to reason correctly. D'Andrade (1989) considered a number of logical isomorphs consisting of a premise in the form of an 'if-then' statement followed by an observation and a set of potential conclusions. For example, If x is true then y is true. (premise) We know that y is not true. (observation) ∴It is the case that x is true. (conclusion) ∴We can't know if x is true or not. (conclusion) ∴It is the case that x is not true. (conclusion) This example illustrates an abstract premise. What is important about this premise from D'Andrade's perspective is that it is not culturally coherent. That is, the subject's culture has nothing in particular to say about the relationship between x and y. Contrast this with a culturally coherent isomorph:
If this is a garnet, then it is a semi-precious stone. (premise) This is not a semi-precious stone. (observation) ∴This is a garnet. (conclusion) ∴We can't know if this is a garnet or not. (conclusion) ∴This is not a garnet. (conclusion)
In a series of experiments, D'Andrade showed that university students can do logic problems when the problem is expressed in terms of a culturally coherent mental schema. D'Andrade hypothesized that the ability to reason correctly with culturally coherent materials is due to the stability of the representation of the premises. Performing the modus tollens inference, as illustrated in the two examples above, requires the subject to make two shifts in perspective. First from the "x" case to the "y" case, and then from the "y" case to the "not y" case. It appears that premises that lack cultural coherence cannot be held stably in memory while the transformations required to make the inferences are performed.
D'Andrade's study indicates that one way to establish the stability of representation required to support rational inference is to make use of cultural models. Because they are shared, cultural models tend to be supported and reinforced by the behavior and thinking of others. Cultural models are also systematic in the sense that they exist in a complex nexus of models that mutually constrain one another. Most cultural models are closely related to many other models. This interlinking contributes to the conservatism of cultural beliefs over time and to the stability of cultural models as resources for individual and group reasoning processes.
Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends
There is another way to achieve stability in cultural models. Cultural models are not only ideas that reside inside minds, they are often also embodied in physical artifacts. Over the years I have collected a number of examples of thinking strategies that involve the interaction of mental structure and material structure. I only recently realized that the conceptual blending framework provides a means of understanding these examples as members of a larger class of cognitive phenomena. The theory of conceptual blending and mental spaces deals with abstract models of the kinds we usually think of as mental models. The organization of the models supports various inferences. The key thing here is the way in which two or more spaces are blended together.
Various elements of the input spaces are selectively mapped to the blended space. In the blended space, new inferences are possible. In fact some new inferences become automatic. In most treatments of conceptual integration, all input spaces are strictly mental constructs. In this paper I would like to explore the possibilities that arise when some or all of the structure contributed by one or more of the input spaces has material form.
Key properties of material anchors for conceptual blends
Consider a blend in which one input space is a conceptual domain consisting of conceptual elements and relations (a space), and the other input is a structured configuration of material elements. As is the case with all blends, cross-space mappings between conceptual and material elements link the two spaces and selective projection from the inputs into the blended space give rise to emergent properties. One of the most important emergent properties of such blends can be the stabilization of the representation of conceptual relations. A mental space is blended with a material structure that is sufficiently immutable to hold the conceptual relationships fixed while other operations are performed. In some cases, the conceptual structures to be represented and manipulated are so complex that they cannot possibly be given stable representation using mental resources alone. In order to produce and manipulate a stable representation of the conceptual elements involved in such computations, the elements must be somehow held (or anchored) in place. The holding in place is accomplished by mapping the conceptual elements onto a relatively stable material structure. This is how a material medium becomes an anchor for a conceptual blend.
A structure is not a material anchor because of some intrinsic quality, but because of the way it is used. It might be better to ask under what conditions something is a material anchor than to ask whether it is a material anchor. If conceptual elements are mapped onto a material pattern in such a way that the relationships among the material elements are taken as proxies (consciously or unconsciously) for relationships among conceptual elements, then the material pattern is acting as a material anchor. The conceptual relationships that are mapped into material structure range from the minimum case of individuation (this element is distinguishable from all others) to extremely complex systems of relationships (the periodic table, for example).
Examples
To illustrate the roles of mental and material structure in thinking I will focus first on a set of examples that involve the coordination of spatial and temporal structure. Some of the examples come from mundane activities while others (the more complex ones) have developed in and are used in culturally elaborated contexts. In what follows, I will begin with blends that are mostly mental and gradually work toward blends that involve more material resources.
As cases involving more and more material structure are considered, I will show how the use of input spaces that contain material structure can create conceptual blends that permit people to do some astonishing thinking while using fairly simple internal cognitive processes. From an anthropological perspective, I believe that the sorts of processes I describe here are absolutely essential to an understanding of the nature of human cognitive accomplishment. The techniques of blending conceptual and material structure change the ratio of cognitive effort to computational accomplishment.
Depending on the environment in which they are deployed, they may either produce increased intellectual accomplishment with high effort or steady output with considerably less effort.
Fictive Motion
Fictive Motion (Fauconnier, 1997; Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 1996 ) is a form of conceptual blend. Consider the sentence, "The fence runs all the way down to the river." In this construction, an input space containing a static scene of a fence and a river is blended with an input space that contributes a moving trajector on a path with a reference point. The moving trajector contributes a shape of motion (movement down a hill to the edge of a river) along the relevant dimension of the static object (the length of the fence). Fauconnier (1997) notes, This is a remarkable mode of expression: It conveys motion and immobility at the same time. Objective immobility is expressed along with perceptual or conceptual motion (the conceptualizer's gaze, mental scanning, or structure projection).
In the blended space, the fence extends down to the river via fictive motion. A set of correspondences between the features of the shape of the fence and the shape of the motion has been established. Fictive motion blends the shape of a movement through space with the spatial shape of an object to produce a temporal sequence of attention to the shape of the object. In the presence of the object, it guides the perceiver's attention. In the absence of the object, it constructs the shape of the object by giving shape to the conceptualizer's mental scan.
Method of Loci
The method of loci provides a well-known example of the cognitive use of material structure. In order to remember a long sequence of ideas, one associates the ideas, in order, with a set of landmarks in the physical environment in which the items will have to be remembered. The method of loci sets up a simple trajectory of attention across a set of features or landmarks of the environment. One may establish a flow through the environment that brings attention to the landmarks in a particular order. This is a layered blend.
The initial input spaces are the shape of the motion of a trajector and the set of landmarks in the environment. Together these produce a blend that is the sequential flow through the landmarks in the environment. The sequential relations of the landmarks are an emergent property of the blend. This space then becomes an input space for a more complex blend. The items to be remembered are associated with the landmarks producing a space in which the items to be remembered are imagined to be co-located with their corresponding landmarks. In this blended space, the items to be remembered acquire the sequential relations that were created among the landmarks. These sequential relations among the items to be remembered is an emergent property of this compound blended space. Like fictive motion, the method of loci blends the shape of a motion of a trajector with objects. In this case, the objects are real rather than imaginary.
The method of loci makes opportunistic use of space. The spatial relations of the landmarks do not contribute any of the semantics of the problem. But the landmarks themselves do provide memory cues, and the sequential relations among the landmarks, that were created by mapping a particular shape of motion onto them, is inherited by the set of items to be remembered. As was the case in fictive motion, a blend of a shape of motion with the spatial extent of a set of objects produces temporal ordering among the objects.
Similar strategies are used in many activities where it is important to do a series of actions in order, making sure each action is done once and only once.
Pilots inspecting their airplanes before flight follow a simple trajectory around the airplane. The shape of the motion imposes a set of sequential relations on the items to be checked. The cognitive problem that is solved is one of the sequential control of action to produce an action set that is exhaustive and non-repetitive.
The Intelligent Use of Space
Fictive motion maps a shape of motion of an imagined trajector onto an imagined object and thereby gives the object shape. In the method of loci, a shape of motion is mapped onto real objects in space to produce sequential relations among those objects. A simple strategy for the disassembly and reassembly of mechanical devices places real objects in space in such a way that a simple shape of motion will produce a sequential ordering on the objects. Kirsh (1995) The blending of conceptual structure with space to create meaningful regions of space is an absolutely ubiquitous process. It appears in activities as varied as respecting personal space to reading gauges and dials (see below).
Japanese hand calendar Nakahara (1996) describes a visualization technique used by Japanese students to compute the day of the week of any day in the year. The problem to be solved here concerns the coordination of the weekly cycle of seven day names with the monthly cycles of 28 (29 in the case of a leap year), 30, or 31 days. The computation is accomplished by mapping the cycle of day names and the cycle of month names onto a common structure. A variety of structures might serve this purpose, but the one chosen by Japanese students, who may need to use the technique during exams, is a set of regions on the first three fingers of the left hand. The mapping of month names onto these regions is invariant (see figure 1 ). This mapping is taught as a sequence of motions of the left thumb over the regions of the fingers.
Since the week is seven days long, in any month all of the days that have numbers that are 0 modulo 7 will fall on the same day of the week. For example, in 2002, the 7th, the 14th, the 21st, and the 28th of August all fall on Wednesday.
The names of the days of the week can be mapped onto the same structure using the top-to-bottom and left-to-right pattern shown. The intersection of this pattern of mapping day names with the pattern for mapping month names produces a complete set of correspondences between day names and months that captures the effect of the varying lengths of months. It's a trivial computation to determine that that is a Wednesday. The 23rd falls two days later, so one can count forward two days, and determine that the 23rd is a Friday.
Mapping the day and month names onto the hand compose the blended space with its emergent properties -the correspondences between day names and months. Locating the landmark date and counting with respect to it are processes that elaborate or "run" the blend. Remember that Fauconnier (1997) said that running the blend, "consists in cognitive work performed within the blend, according to its own emergent logic." The day of the week of any date in the year can easily be determined by simple processes of locating a nearby known landmark and counting up or down to the desired date. Dates such as the 10 th or the 25 th that have numbers that are 3 or 4 modulo 7 require more counting and memory than dates that are nearer 0 modulo 7. For cases that require much counting, the ability to do the counting on the fingers itself provides a considerable reduction in the memory demands of the task. Japanese youngsters use this technique to respond to exam questions. The examinations are intended to assess the intellectual abilities of the students.
The students appear to have performed complex reasoning, when in fact they have simply done some clever situated seeing. I believe that this general phenomenon is so widespread that much of human intelligence relies on "tricks" of this kind. To make that case, let me introduce some more examples.
Micronesian Navigation
Micronesian navigators routinely sail hundreds of miles out of sight of land without the use of charts, tables, or any of the other instruments deemed necessary by Western navigators (Gladwin, 1970; Lewis, 1976; Sarfert, 1911) .
Instead, they use an elegant system of superimposed mental images (Hutchins, 1983; Hutchins and Hinton, 1984; Hutchins, 1995) . The rising and setting points of selected stars anchor these mental images.
The techniques used by Micronesian Navigators are quite complex. It takes many years of study to master the knowledge and skills required to sail with these techniques. Here I can only briefly sketch a technique that is used to express the position of the canoe during a voyage.
For every voyage between two islands, there is another island off to the side of the course, called the etak island, that the navigator keeps in mind. Since these navigators do not have charts, they do not think of the voyage in terms of the motion of the canoe between the origin and destination as is so natural for us.
Rather they imagine the voyage in terms of the movement of the etak island.
They know the star bearings between all pairs of islands in their vicinity. This allows them to hold course while sailing to their destination, but it also allows them to imagine that at the beginning of the voyage, the etak island will be at the star bearing of the etak island from the origin. At the end of the voyage, when the canoe has reached the destination, the etak island will be at the This system involves the opportunistic use of material structure as an anchor for the superposition of structure from several input spaces. The model is "run" by imagining the superposition of several kinds of structure thereby producing a blended space in which the ability to infer location from time is an emergent property. The use of this very complex blended space depends on the stability of the representations of metrical relations which would be impossible without the material anchor provided by the star points. Unlike the case of the Japanese hand calendar, the opportunistically used patterns of star points also carries part of the content of the task domain. The two examples given above involve mental models that are anchored to physical structures that exist in nature independent of the cultural activities that have appropriated them. Sometimes, of course, cultural models are embodied in the physical structure of created artifacts.
Medieval Tide Computer
Frake (1985) describes a medieval tide computer.
The wind rose is an ancient schema that, for most of its history and in most places had nothing in particular to do with representing knowledge of the tides. It was used, first and foremost as a way to express direction. Secondarily, it was used to express solar time. In whatever manner time was determined at some moment, it was thought of and expressed as a compass bearing. The sun bears south at noon. It was therefore thought of as being north at midnight, east at 6 a.m. and west at 6 p.m. Only the first of these bearings is of any use in northern Europe for determining time. The other bearings were ways of expressing time. The use of the medieval compass rose in the prediction of tides is a fine example of the empirical construction of an artifact in the absence of a theory of the phenomenon it permits navigators to predict. In this case, the compass card provides a stable spatial structure onto which conventional techniques of imagining solar times produce a composite image of direction and solar time.
Lunar time, which is closely correlated with the tides, is determined by locating a landmark and counting with respect to that landmark.
The utility of the correspondence between the amount of solar time represented by two adjacent points of the compass and the change in the relation of lunar to solar time each day depends on the serendipitous fact that the compass divides the day into 32 equal segments of 45 minutes each and the moon lags 1/29 th of a day (or about 48 minutes) behind the sun each day.
As was the case with the Japanese hand calculator, the computation is done and the blend is "run" in this system by locating a convenient landmark (the establishment of the port) and counting days before or after the full or new moon with respect to that landmark. Again, the memory loads can be reduced by first selectively mapping from the input spaces to locate the landmark, then performing the counting operations on the physical structure, and finally selectively mapping from the input spaces again to identify the relevant properties of the location identified by the counting operation. The representations involved here are too complex to hold stable in memory while running the blend.
These examples are from somewhat exotic domains. It would be nice to think that I found these examples in the world of navigation mostly because I know navigation so well and have thought about it for a long time, not because navigation is in some way different from other human activities. The fact is, however, that navigation is different in the sense that it is a high-stakes activity and the value of finding and saving reliable regularities in the task environment is greater in this domain than in many others. Other high-stakes activities show similar cultural developments. Of course these activities are more representative of everyday human cognition than most laboratory experiments are. The special nature of these tasks still raises the question of the extent to which these examples are representative of the role of material anchors for conceptual blends in everyday life. To address this, let us turn to one of the most widely used artifacts of modern life, the clock.
Clocks, Dials, and Sliderule
There is an obvious link between the medieval tide computation and the clock face. The compass rose with times on it is a full sibling to the sundial and the sundial is a direct ancestor of the clock. Both the compass-rose-mapped-withtime and the sundial are blends of the time-line with the direction frame. One is adapted to the ecology of maritime models and the other to the cognitive ecology of landlubbers. Reading a clock is a process of running a very complex nested conceptual blend. It is possible to decompose the clock face all the way back to gnomon and number line, but of course, it is not necessary to know this decomposition or the history that resulted in the layered composition of spaces that make up the clock face in order to read the clock.
The strategy of mapping numbers onto a circular line is common in dials and instruments of many kinds. This is especially apt when the numbers represent a quantity with periodic expression such as time. These instruments rely on a stable anchor (with dynamic moving parts) onto which images of conventional structure are mapped to compose a complex blend. The movement of an imagined trajector gives meaning to the momentarily stationary watch hands, which "go around" to use a fictive motion description, but the actual movement of the hands is necessary to the operation of the device since we are not able to imagine the velocity of movement of the hands with any accuracy.
As a final example of a conceptual blend with material anchors, consider the sliderule. In a sliderule, the abstract quantity logarithm of number is mapped onto an extent of space. Two such spaces lying next to each other make it easy to add together the extents of space corresponding to the logarithms of two numbers. Since the addition of logarithms is an implementation of multiplication, the extent of space corresponding to the sum of the extents of space of the logarithms of the two numbers corresponds to the logarithm of the product of the numbers. The input spaces in this blend are the two representations of the logarithms of the numbers to be multiplied. The blended space is composed by positioning these two spaces with respect to each other in such a way that the total extent of the sum of the extents of space can be seen. The blend is run by reading the product as a number on the scale at the appropriate place. In this case, a specially designed device is manipulated to form the conceptual blend because it is impossible to imagine these conceptual relations with sufficient stability and precision to run the blend using mental resources alone.
Discussion.
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) devote a chapter to "things" in which they draw upon my work on material anchors. They discuss the clock face, other gauges and the method of loci along the lines I have presented here. They also extend the analysis to graves, headstones, dead people, money, and spoken and written language. Their extension of the material anchors framework to these phenomena is justified by their assumption that material anchors are "objects that prompt for elaborate conceptual integration networks." This broad definition seems to imply that every symbol and sign is a material anchor for a conceptual blend. In the framework developed here symbols appear as the weakest type of material anchor.
Is spoken language a material anchor? Fauconnier and Turner seem to think so, but this claim requires reflection, and a simple yes/no answer misses much of interest here. The minimal informative structure in a material space is individuation -the notion that some material element is different from or distinguishable from other elements. Taking a word (as a material form either spoken or written) by itself as a material anchor involves this sort of simple mapping. The conceptual space is the lexical contrast set for the word, the other words that might have occurred, but did not. This conceptual space is mapped into the material anchor of the word as a pattern of sound or of written shape. Since symbols typically have arbitrary relations to the things they denote, the material structure provides only the perceptual identity of the physical form as distinct from other physical forms. Thus, a word can be seen as a material anchor for a conceptual blend, but the contribution of the material medium to the blended space is minimal.
Linguistic units larger than the word may make use of more interesting material structure. Grammatical forms, such as agreements between modifiers and modifieds, between predicates and subjects, and between functions and arguments, may rely on a greater contribution of the material form. The conceptual relation of modifier to modified, for example, is mapped into the physical structure of word order in many languages. Of course, this conceptual relation may also be supported by other structure such as lexical or morphological cues.
Still, it may make more sense to say that the temporal or spatial organization of a spoken or written sentence can be a material anchor for some portion of the grammatical conceptual structure, than it does to say that a word is a material anchor for the concept it represents. This is because in the case of grammar, more complex aspects of the material organization are involved. No doubt the fact that spoken language has material form was important in the development of language, as the material forms provided anchors for concepts and conceptual relations.
In a recent note, Brandt (n.d.) discussed the notion of the compass as a material anchor. Brandt emphasized the role of the compass needle as a probe that brings information from the "hidden side of reality" to "our side of reality". Focussing on the compass needle and jumping to the interpretation of the compass system as a probe presupposes, and thereby overlooks, the process that I had hoped to highlight with the phrase, "material anchor." From the point of view of material anchors, the compass rose, and not the compass needle, is where the action is. The complex set of spatial relations among the directions (however the frame is conceptualized, e.g., points of the compass, degrees, etc.) cannot be stably maintained and operated upon in a purely mental representation. In order to produce and manipulate a stable representation of the conceptual elements involved in reasoning about directions, the elements must be somehow held (or anchored) in place. This holding-in-place is accomplished by mapping the conceptual elements onto a relatively stable material structure, the compass rose.
The focus on the compass needle rather than the compass rose lead Brandt to assert that "'Material anchors' are signs, and their meanings may all be understood by similar analyses." (Brandt, n.d.) While this does seem to be consistent with the interpretation that Fauconnier and Turner have given the phrase 'material anchors', I do not use it this way. Because a sign is a pattern in a material medium that captures a minimal aspect of the conceptual domain, a sign is a very weak form of material anchor.
Conceptual models embody/express/hold constraints among conceptual elements. In order to play a role in reasoning, a conceptual model must be cognitively stable. That is, it must maintain its system of constraints while being subjected to mental (or physical) manipulation. The stability of some conceptual models is provided by their simplicity. Very simple trajectories of attention are easy to remember and apply. The stability of more complex conceptual models is sometimes provided by their being embedded in conventional (culturally shared) well-learned and automatically applied internal mental structure. A conceptual model with these properties is a cultural model. With enough practice, support, and motivation, even complex and nearly arbitrary mappings can be learned. In a system of cultural models, each model constrains and is constrained by a rich network of relations to other models in the cultural belief system. It is possible to reason efficiently about complex problems when they are expressed in terms of cultural models.
Other conceptual models achieve stability by virtue of being embodied in an external physical medium. Problems that are too complex to hold in mind as a cultural model, and possibly some that are too complex to express at all in internal conceptual models, can be expressed and manipulated in external media.
The examples presented in this paper illustrate a continuum of cases from those in which external media provide little or no structure of the model to those in which virtually all aspects of the conceptual model are embodied in the structure of external media and the cognitive operations performed on the model are implemented as physical manipulation of external structure. The principal cognitive effect of using conceptual models is achieved by building the constraints of the task into the constraints of the representations. This is true whether the representation is entirely a mental image or if it is embodied somehow in physical form.
In the first examples, method of loci, intelligent use of space, and the Japanese hand calendar, the contribution of the material medium is only a set of stable spatial landmarks onto which image structure can be attached and held. Next comes Micronesian navigation, in which the physical structure of the rising and setting points of stars provides a set of landmarks that are themselves task relevant content. The environmental structure used by the Micronesian navigators is not designed for the task. It exists independently of this activity, but it becomes "artifactual" by virtue of the conceptual relationships that the navigators establish between it and other task elements. The star points are opportunistically used natural structure. The compass rose, as exploited by medieval seafarers to reckon the tides is opportunistically used artifactual structure. It was created by seafarers, but not originally created for this use.
Finally, there are cases where the structure is designed for particular problems.
Along this continuum, as the nature of the structure of the conceptual models changes from strictly mental representations to more external structure, the kinds of cognitive processes that are involved in "running the blend" also change. In simple cases, it may be possible to perform a cognitive task, say an inference, with these representations simply by imagining the superimposition of elements of structure. In more complex cases, the fact that some of the task relevant structure is crystallized in a material artifact may reduce the demands on memory. Computing on complex mental images that have material anchors permits people to substitute robust and fast perceptual processes for slow and vulnerable conceptual processes. Since conceptual models work by embodying constraints among conceptual elements, both memory and processing loads can be reduced if the constraints of the task can be built into the physical structure of a material device.
In some cases it is possible to do the cognitive work by imagining the manipulation of a physical structure. In others, the case of the sliderule for example, it is necessary to manipulate the physical device itself because it is not possible to imagine it accurately enough to be of use. The cultural process of crystallizing conceptual models in material structure and saving those up through time puts modern humans in a world where thinking depends in significant measure on the availability of a set of physical structures that can be manipulated in this way.
A final turn on this path is that when a material structure becomes very familiar, it may be possible to imagine the material structure when it is not present in the environment. It is even possible to imagine systematic transformations applied to such a representation. This happened historically with the development of mathematical and logical symbol systems in our own cultural tradition. Unfortunately, much of cognitive science is based on the mistaken view that this relatively recent cultural invention is the fundamental architecture of cognition (Hutchins, 1995) . The very idea of rationality, as held by game-theorists, economists, and political scientists, is a cultural construct that owes its existence to the ability to create a certain class of materially anchored conceptual blends. It is a mistake to assume that thinking is, in general, a symbol manipulation process.
Which came first, the purely internal models or the materially embodied models? My guess is that a process like the blending of a simple trajector with a static object (as is seen in fictive motion) is an extremely old cognitive strategy. Wynn (1989) examined stone tools going back several millions of years. He describes an innovation that arose about a million years ago. Tool makers before that could strike a stone repeatedly in nearly the same place. At that time, they began striking a stone a sequence of blows, each one a little further along the stone than the last. This looks like an operational version of the projection of a simple trajector onto the activity of chipping stones. Might this materially anchored activity have been a precursor to the ability to form simple internal blends? As is the case today, it must have been true in the past that people were capable of conceptual feats supported by material anchors that could not be undertaken using mental resources alone. In the past two decades, speculations on the intelligence have given more emphasis to the demands of social reasoning than to tool making. Perhaps viewing conceptual models in this way will revive the importance of the tool-making heritage. In any case, it seems likely to me that patterns of interaction with emergent regularities in the material and social environment provide the basis for whatever truly internal conceptual skills we have.
It is also important to stress the systematicity of the models presented in this paper. This is not simply a set of isolated examples of clever cognitive strategies. Rather, the models presented here are elements of whole systems of conceptual blends that have accumulated and been layered, one over the other, to produce complex emergent properties. Of course, it is not necessary for the users of these tools to know the history of the tool any more than it is necessary for us to know the history of the blends that we find in language.
Each of the examples presented here is part of a larger cognitive ecology and a system of cultural models. The examples are also unified by the fact that each also illustrates the operation of the cognitive processes known as conceptual blending. Conceptual blending has previously been seen as an entirely internal cognitive process. I have tried to show in this paper that the same kinds of processes operate in situations where one or more of the input spaces to the blend contain material structure. This unification is important because it provides an antidote to the false dichotomy that has recently been placed between the study of conceptual models and the study of material resources for thinking.
